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Abstract: The diffusion of Electric Vehicles (EV) fostered by the evolution of the power
system towards the new concept of Smart Grid introduces several technological challenges
related to the synergy among electricity-propelled vehicle fleets and the energy grid
ecosystem. EVs promise to reduce carbon emissions by exploiting Renewable Energy
Sources (RESes) for battery recharge, and could potentially serve as storage bank to flatten
the fluctuations of power generation caused by the intermittent nature of RESes by relying
on a load aggregator, which intelligently schedules the battery charge/discharge of a fleet of
vehicles according to the users’ requests and grid’s needs. However, the introduction of such
vehicle-to-grid (V2G) infrastructure rises also privacy concerns: plugging the vehicles in the
recharging infrastructures may expose private information regarding the user’s locations and
travelling habits. Therefore, this paper proposes a privacy-preserving V2G infrastructure
which does not disclose to the aggregator the current battery charge level, the amount of
refilled energy, nor the time periods in which the vehicles are actually plugged in. The
communication protocol relies on the Shamir Secret Sharing threshold cryptosystem. We
evaluate the security properties of our solution and compare its performance to the optimal
scheduling achievable by means of an Integer Linear Program (ILP) aimed at maximizing
the ratio of the amount of charged/discharged energy to/from the EV’s batteries to the grid
power availability/request. This way, we quantify the reduction in the effectiveness of the
scheduling strategy due to the preservation of data privacy.
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1. Introduction
The evolution of the electric power system toward the novel Smart Grid paradigm and the progressive
concurrent electrification of transportation aimed at the reduction of carbon emissions rises various
issues related to the interactions between the distribution network and the Electric Vehicles (EVs).
Such category of vehicles includes battery/fuel cell-powered automobiles, as well as hybrid systems
combining electricity generators and conventional gasoline engines [1,2]. Several investigations on
the potential market penetration of EVs and on the impacts of their possible massive introduction
have been carried out by the research community [3,4]: on one hand, the additional connected load
capacity required to simultaneously recharge a huge number of EVs might significantly impact the
energy consumption trend; on the other hand, the EVs’ batteries represent a huge storage bank that
can be exploited to flatten the typically unpredictable power generation patterns of Renewable Energy
Sources (RESes) by accumulating energy in case of excessive power generation and transferring it
back to the grid during peak-demand periods [5,6]. To enable such synergies between EVs and the
Smart Grid, which are usually referred to as Vehicle-to-Grid (V2G) interactions, the introduction of an
aggregator capable of coordinating the charging/discharging process for a huge fleet of vehicles has been
proposed [7,8]: the role of such agent is to operate as middleman between the vehicle owner (who could
not act as stakeholder on the electricity market due to the limited power capacity of a single vehicle)
and the electrical utilities or system operators. Several business models for the aggregation entity have
been studied, possibly taking into account the additional costs incurred by the EVs’ owners due to the
frequent battery charge/discharge and the introduction of financial incentives to encourage the owners to
plug their vehicle when not in use [9,10]. However, V2G assumes that detailed information about the
traveling habits of the vehicle owners are available at the aggregator, which can disclose sensitive data
(e.g., presence in a certain location at a given time) and thus arises privacy concerns [11,12]: according to
NIST [13], once a two-way communication between the EV and the charging station is established, there
is currently no technical limitation to the amount and type of data that could be obtained from the EV’s
microcomputers which manages specific functions such as breaking, ignition systems, lighting controls,
fuel delivery, on-board diagnostics, and so on. This could lead to potentially threatening consequences:
for instance, burglars could track people’s movements before attempting robberies, information about
vehicle maintenance could be inferred and exploited for insurance and warranties, or companies could
perform targeted marketing for car-related services.
The main contributions of our paper are:
• the design of a privacy preserving online framework which allows a set of Aggregators to
collaboratively coordinate the charging/discharging process of the vehicles’ batteries without
learning the time periods in which the EVs are actually plugged-in and the current charge level
of the batteries, nor the amount of refilled energy: every data is split in w parts called shares by
means of the Shamir Secret Sharing (SSS) threshold cryptosystem and each share is given to a
different Aggregator. The protocol ensures that a collusion of less than t ≤ w Aggregators cannot
reconstruct the data.
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• the definition of a set of security properties which capture the requirements of V2G interactions
for battery recharge and the proof that such properties are satisfied by our proposed
scheduling protocol.
• the formulation of a benchmark offline scheduling problem, which assumes full knowledge of
the future travels of the users and of the battery-related information before the beginning of the
scheduling horizon.
• the comparison of the performance of our privacy-friendly mechanism to the benchmark model.
This way, we quantify the reduction in the effectiveness of the scheduling strategy due to
incorporating data privacy preservation in the scheduling mechanism.
The benefits introduced by our privacy-friendly protocol are twofold: on one hand, it encourages
the EV owners to take part in the scheduling optimization framework by protecting their personal
data. Assuming an underlying business model which rewards the users that allow for the discharge
of their EV’s batteries, providing privacy in V2G interactions could therefore lead to significant cost
savings for the individual users. On the other hand, the wider is the EV fleet participating to the
protocol, the higher is the degree of flexibility experienced by the grid in the management of the power
generation/consumption balancing, thus helping in a more effective compensation of the unpredictable
power generation patterns of RESes.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 provides an overview of the related
literature, while some background notions about the SSS scheme are recalled in Section 3. The
privacy-friendly scheduling infrastructure, the collaborative scheduling procedure and the associated
communication protocol are discussed in Section 4. The security analysis of the proposed scheduling
mechanism are presented in Section 5, while Section 6 introduces an Integer Linear Programming
formulation for the optimal scheduling to be used as evaluation benchmark. The performance assessment
of our proposed solution is discussed in Section 7. Final conclusions are drawn in the last Section.
2. Related Work
The design of EVs and the characterization of their interactions with the power grid has been widely
investigated in the last decade: for a comprehensive survey on the impact of the introduction of EVs in
the Smart Grid ecosystem, the reader is referred to [14], while a thorough overview on the economical
and technical models of aggregator agents for EV fleets can be found in [15].
A substantial body of work investigates optimal and heuristic policies for the battery recharge of
a population of EVs based on various approaches, ranging from game theory [16,17] to queuing
theory [18,19], possibly associated with reinforcement learning techniques [20] or stochastic/fuzzy
logic-based predictors [21]. Game models are suitable for scenarios involving multiple selfish entities,
each one operating with the aim of optimizing his own utility function, and allow for possible
negotiations among them. Conversely, in our framework we assume that the vehicle owners fully
collaborate with the aggregator in order to achieve a common optimization goal in terms of balancing
of the grid’s power availability, without assumption of any economical incentives. Queuing models
are employed to capture constraints such as limits on the maximum number of EVs to be charged
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contemporaneously: our scenario assumes that the charging station is equipped with a sufficient number
of plugs to serve the whole fleet without introducing additional waiting times.
However, none of the above papers addresses the privacy-related issues which are peculiar of the V2G
scenario, which have been considered only by a few studies: Stegelmann and Kesdogann [22] enumerate
the security requirements of a V2G infrastructure in presence of an untrusted aggregator, and formalize
the model of an honest-but-curious attacker which tries to infer the traveling habits of the vehicle owners
by linking the plugging/unplugging events at the charging stations in different locations. The same
authors further refine such adversary model in [23] by integrating information regarding the charge level
of the EV’s batteries. We consider the same attacker model, and our solution ensures that the aggregators
schedule the charging/discharging process without knowing the total amount of energy to be provided
to the battery, nor the time periods in which the EV is actually plugged. The only information available
at the aggregators is a priority tag which declares whether the EV must be necessarily charged or could
also be discharged, according to the current battery charge level, which remains undisclosed.
Yang et al. [24] also assume a honest-but-curious aggregator model in a two-tiered structure including
multiple local aggregators directly interacting with the vehicles and a central aggregator which interfaces
the electricity market, and propose a rewarding scheme based on blind signature techniques, which
ensures mutual authentication while preserving location and identity privacy, and allows for anonymous
rewards. Our solution is based on Shamir Secret Sharing scheme, which is computationally less
demanding, but requires the collaboration of multiple scheduling entities, thus introducing additional
message exchanges among them (which would not occur in presence of a single aggregator).
Liu et al. propose in [25] a two-way anonymous payment system for EVs’ battery charge/discharge
providing traceability in case of car theft, while Nicanfar et al. [26] design a pseudonym-based
authentication scheme, which ensures untraceability of the users’ movements and assumes the presence
of an external trusted entity in charge of recording the associations between pseudonyms and real
identities to provide accountability for billing purposes. Though the security of the billing process is
out of the scope of our contribution, similar protocols could be easily integrated in our infrastructure.
3. Background on Shamir Secret Sharing Scheme
Shamir Secret Sharing (SSS) scheme [27] is a cryptographic threshold scheme which allows multiple
participants to reconstruct a secret by means of a collaborative procedure. To do so, the secret is split
in w shares, which are given to the participants to the protocol: the secret can be recovered through
cooperation of at least t ≤ w participants, where the threshold t is a system design parameter.
More in detail, the SSS scheme works as follows. Choose a prime number q and split the secret m ∈ Zq
inw shares (xs, ys) (1 ≤ s ≤ w) by selecting t−1 integer random numbers ρ1, ρ2, · · · , ρt−1 with uniform
distribution in [0, q− 1] and calculating the s-th share as ys = m+ ρ1xs + ρ2x2s + . . .+ ρt−1xt−1s mod q,
where xs ∈ Zq is arbitrarily chosen. The secret can be reconstructed by interpolating at least t shares,
using e.g., the Lagrange interpolation algorithm. The SSS scheme has homomorphic properties with
respect to addition and multiplication, meaning that performing such operations on the shares and
then recovering the result leads to the same result that would be obtained by computing the same
operations on the secrets directly. The sum of two secrets can be independently calculated by a
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single participant by summing the corresponding shares, while multiplication must be performed
interactively by means of a collaborative procedure, e.g., as the one described in [28]. Therefore, any
function expressed in terms of additions and multiplications can be calculated directly on the shares.
In particular, several collaborative methods to perform the comparison of two secrets have been
proposed (see e.g., [29,30]). In this paper, we will adopt the comparison protocol presented in [30],
which works as follows: each party holding the s-th shares (xs, ys), (x′s, y
′
s) of the secrets m and m
′ to
be compared selects two big random numbers rs, r′s, which can multiplicatively hide m − m′, and a
random bit bs ∈ {0, 1}. The collaborative protocol enables each party to obtain a share of the quantity
c = (m − m′)∏ts=1(−1)bsrs −∑ts=1(−1)1−bsr′s. The result of the comparison can be computed by
retrieving c, setting a bit e either to 0 in case c > 0 or to 1 otherwise (note that in a modulo n field
negative numbers are represented by the upper half of the range [0, n − 1]), and calculating the result
of the XOR operation ξ = e ⊕ b1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ bt. ξ = 0 indicates that m > m′, while ξ = 1 indicates that
m ≤ m′. The reader is referred to [30] for additional details about the collaborative procedure and the
proof of the correctness of the comparison protocol.
4. The Privacy-Friendly V2G Communication Framework
As depicted in Figure 1, our proposed architecture comprises a set of EVs, V , a set of Aggregators,
A, which collaboratively schedule the charge/discharge of the EVs’ batteries, and an Anonymizer which
collects the messages sent by the EVs and replaces their IDs with pseudonyms before forwarding the
messages to the Aggregators. The Anonymizer also receives the charge/discharge schedules from the
Aggregators and communicates each of them to the addressed EV.
Figure 1. The privacy-friendly scheduling infrastructure.
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We assume that:
(1) Each EV is equipped with hardware and software (e.g., as described in [31,32]) enabling Internet
access at any time.
(2) A Configurator node is responsible for the setup of a suitable public-key infrastructure (e.g., as the
one proposed in [33]).
(3) The parties agree on a hybrid encryption algorithm E(Ke, ·) and a corresponding decryption
algorithm D(Kd, ·). The hybrid scheme is assumed to be IND-CPA secure [34] (i.e., it ensures
message indistinguishability under chosen plaintext attack) and uses state-of-the art secure public
key cryptography and symmetric cryptography to transmit messages of any size.
(4) Each Aggregator a ∈ A has its own pair of public/private keys (Kae , Kad ) and all the EVs know the
public keys of the Aggregators.
(5) All the communication channels between the EVs, the Anonymizer, and the Aggregators are
confidential and authenticated.
We also assume that time is divided in a set of epochs I of finite duration T (e.g., in the order of
minutes) and that at the beginning of each epoch i ∈ I the system operator communicates the maximum
amount gi of power it can provide to recharge the Vehicles or it would need to discharge in order to satisfy
the demands generated by other categories of critical loads (e.g., non-deferrable appliances). Such power
supply/request curve is supposed to be public and known to all the Aggregators.
The design goal is to schedule the charge/discharge times of the EVs’ batteries through a collaborative
procedure in order to satisfy the customers’ recharge requests while minimizing the difference between
the power supplied (requested) by the grid and the power charged (discharged) to (from) the batteries,
without exceeding the grid overall power availability (request).
A pictorial view of the exchanged messages between Vehicles and Aggregators is presented in
Figure 2, while a list of the main symbols is provided in Table 1.
Figure 2. Data exchange during the battery charge/discharge scheduling procedure.
Vehicle, v Anonymizer Aggregator, a Aggregator, a
IDv, EKae (bvi||Sa(γvi)||Kvie )
IDv, EKae (bvi||Sa(γvi)||Kvie )
Πvi, EKae (bvi||Sa(γvi)||Kvie )
Πvi, EKae (bvi||Sa(γvi)||Kvie )
collaborative scheduling
Πvi, EKvie (ΓΠvi)
EKvie (ΓΠvi)
Energies 2014, 7 2786
Table 1. List of main symbols.
Notation Description
V set of Vehicles (v is an element of the set)
A set of Aggregators (a is an element of the set)
I set of time epochs (i is an element of the set)
rv battery charging rate of Vehicle v
bvi recharge priority indicator of Vehicle v at epoch i
lvi battery charge level of Vehicle v at epoch i
γvi requested battery charge/discharge indicator of Vehicle v at epoch i
tv battery threshold level below which no discharge is accepted by Vehicle v
Kvie ,K
vi
d ephemeral encryption/decryption key-pair generated by Vehicle v at epoch i
IDv identifier of Vehicle v
Πvi pseudonym attributed to Vehicle v at epoch i
Si set of the pseudonyms Πvi at epoch i
Γvi scheduled battery charge/discharge indicator of Vehicle v at epoch i
Whenever a new epoch i starts, each Vehicle v ∈ V initializes a parameter γvi either to 0, in case it is
unable or unwilling to be charged/discharged (for instance because it is currently traveling or because its
battery is already full) or to rv, which indicates the Vehicle’s charge/discharge rate. Moreover, v defines
a threshold tv indicating the level of charge below which no discharge is accepted by the customer.
In a worst-case scenario, tv equals the level of full battery charge, meaning that the customer does not
allow for any discharge. Let lvi be the battery charge level of v at the beginning of epoch i: if lvi < tv,
v sets a priority bit bvi to 1, otherwise to 0. Further, v generates an ephemeral keypair (Kvie , K
vi
d ), which
is refreshed at every epoch. Then, v divides γvi in shares using a (w, t)-SSS scheme with parameters
t = w = |A|, thus obtaining |A| shares S1(γvi), . . . , S|A|(γvi), and concatenates the priority bit bvi and
the ephemeral encryption key Kvie to each share Sa(γvi). For the sake of easiness, in this paper we set as
SSS threshold t = w, meaning that all the Aggregators must collaborate to perform the charge/discharge
scheduling procedure. However, to improve resiliency to faults and malfunctions, t could be lower than
w. For a discussion on the correct dimensioning of t and w, the reader is referred to [35]. Finally,
v encrypts bvi||Sa(γvi)||Kvie using the public key Kae for each Aggregator a ∈ A and sends the pair
IDv, EKae (bvi||Sa(γvi)||Kvie ) to the Anonymizer, where IDv is the identity of Vehicle v.
Upon reception of the |A| messages sent by v, the Anonymizer replaces IDv with a random
pseudonym Πvi, which is refreshed at every epoch, and forwards each pair Πvi, EKae (bvi||Sa(γvi)||Kvie )
to the respective Aggregator a.
Let ΓΠvi be the scheduling output of the Vehicle associated to the pseudonym Πvi, which can be set by
the Aggregators either to 1 if the Vehicle is scheduled for recharge, to−1 if it is scheduled for discharge,
or to 0 otherwise. Moreover, let Pi be a variable which records the amount of power required for the
charges/discharges scheduled during the current epoch i: positive values of Pi indicate that the grid must
provide power to charge the batteries, while negative values indicate that the energy collected from the
batteries is injected in the grid.
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Algorithm 1 The Privacy-Friendly Scheduling Algorithm
1: On input of the epoch number i and of Πvi, bvi, Sa(γvi), Kvie ∀v ∈ V
2: Si ← {Πvi ∀v ∈ V},Vh ← {Πvi ∈ Si : bvi = 1},Vl ← {Πvi ∈ Si : bvi = 0},ΓΠvi ← bvi ∀Πvi ∈ Si
3: Sa(Pi)← Sa(Pi) +
∑
v : Πvi∈Vh(γvi)
4: for all Πvi ∈ Vl do
5: if gi > 0 then
6: collaboratively compare Pi + rv and gi
7: if Pi + rv < gi then
8: Sa(Pi)← Sa(Pi) + Sa(γvi),ΓΠvi ← 1 {The grid provides enough energy to recharge v}
9: else
10: collaboratively compare Pi and gi
11: if Pi > gi then
12: Sa(Pi) ← Sa(Pi) − Sa(γvi),ΓΠvi ← −1 {v is discharged to reduce the amount of energy
taken from the grid}
13: end if
14: end if
15: else
16: collaboratively compare Pi − rv and gi
17: if Pi − rv > gi then
18: Sa(Pi)← Sa(Pi)− Sa(γvi),ΓΠvi ← −1 {v is discharged to inject energy from the battery to
the grid}
19: else
20: collaboratively compare Pi and gi
21: if Pi < gi then
22: Sa(Pi) ← Sa(Pi) + Sa(γvi),ΓΠvi ← 1 {v is charged to reduce the excessive amount of
energy provided by the batteries to the grid}
23: end if
24: end if
25: end if
26: end for
Initially, a designated Aggregator a sets Pi to 0, divides it in shares and distributes the shares Sa(Pi)
to the Aggregators. Once all the pseudonymized messages from every EV have been received by the
Aggregators, each Aggregator a decrypts the incoming messages using its private key Kad and retrieves
the triple bvi, Sa(rv), Kvie for each Vehicle v, then it operates according to Algorithm 1 as follows:
(1) It groups the EVs’pseudonyms in two sets Vh and Vl. The former set includes all the pseudonyms
associated to Vehicles with bvi = 1 which do not allow battery discharge, while all the other
pseudonyms are grouped in Vl. Note that the Vehicles whose pseudonyms are in Vh are considered
to have high charge priority, meaning that they will always be scheduled for recharge, regardless
to the energy availability of the grid. Conversely, the Vehicles belonging to Vl can be either
charged/discharged or not, in order to meet the grid power offer/demand.
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(2) The recharge of each Vehicle with pseudonym Πvi ∈ Vh is scheduled for the epoch i by setting
ΓΠvi to 1 and the total power amount Pi is updated by adding the corresponding share Sa(γvi).
Note that the additions are performed directly on the shares, therefore the Aggregator operates
without knowing the values γvi. In case γvi = 0, i.e., v is not available for recharge/discharge,
adding Sa(γvi) to Sa(Pi) does not alter the current values of Pi.
(3) For each Vehicle associated to a pseudonym Πvi ∈ Vl, if gi > 0 (i.e., the grid has a power surplus
which can be used to recharge the batteries), the Aggregators collaboratively compare Pi +γvi and
gi by means of the comparison protocol presented in [30]. Without loss of generality, we assume
that the Aggregator a is elected as responsible of defining the order of service of the vehicles in Vl
(which is randomly chosen at every epoch) and to communicate it to the other Aggregators. If the
current power amount (including the recharge of v) does not exceed gi, v is scheduled for recharge,
otherwise a second collaborative comparison between Pi and gi is performed: if Pi exceeds gi
(meaning that the current energy used to serve the Vehicles exceeds the grid’s power availability),
the discharge of v is scheduled, otherwise no charge/discharge takes place. Analogously, for
gi < 0, Pi − γvi and gi are collaboratively compared and in case Pi − rv exceeds gi, the discharge
of the battery of v is scheduled in order to reduce the amount of energy used for recharging,
otherwise the Aggregators compare again Pi to gi and if Pi < gi (i.e., the total discharged energy
exceeds the grid’s needs), v is recharged. Conversely, in case Pi ≥ gi, no action is scheduled.
Once the scheduling procedure is concluded, a sends to the Anonymizer the scheduling output
EKvie (ΓΠvi) encrypted under the ephemeral encryption key of Vehicle v and the corresponding
pseudonym Πvi. The Anonymizer retrieves the identity IDv of the Vehicle associated to Πvi, forwards
EKvie (ΓΠvi) to v, which obtains ΓΠvi by decrypting the message with its private ephemeral key K
vi
d and
schedules its battery charge/discharge accordingly.
5. Security Discussion
In this Section we discuss the adversarial model, state definitions of the privacy properties of our
scheduling mechanism and provide proofs that such properties are guaranteed by our framework.
We assume that each Aggregator behave according to the honest-but-curious attacker model, meaning
that it honestly executes the scheduling algorithm, but tries to obtain further information about the current
battery levels of the EVs and the amount of refilled energy by performing arbitrary elaborations on
the messages they receive, possibly colluding with other Aggregators (but not with the Anonymizer).
The Anonymizer is also supposed to be honest-but-curious. Conversely, the EVs are assumed to by
honest nodes.
We now define the property of blindness, which the proposed infrastructure satisfies.
Definition 1. The scheduling infrastructure provides blindness if during any set of epochs I a collusion
of A˜ Aggregators of cardinality c < |A| cannot relate bvi to the identity IDv of the Vehicle which
generated it during any set of epochs I and obtains no additional information with respect to what is
implied by the knowledge of (Sa(γvi), bvi) for each Aggregator a ∈ A˜.
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More formally, we define the Blind experiment, involving a challenger C controlling the
Anonymizer node and a probabilistic polynomial-time adversary D controlling the set of colluded
Aggregators A˜ : |A˜| < A:
(1) D selects four sets of Vehicles Vh0 ,V l0,Vh1 ,V l1 ⊆ V : bvi = 1 ∀i ∈ I, v ∈ Vh0 ,Vh1 ∧ bvi = 0
∀i ∈ I, v ∈ V l0,V l1 ∧ |Vh0 | = |Vh1 | ∧ |V l0| = |V l1|, the identifiers IDv, the values γvi and the random
numbers ρ1, ρ2, . . . , ρt−1 to be used to divide each γvi in shares for each Vehicle in Vh0 ,V l0,Vh1 ,V l1,
and communicates them to C.
(2) C selects a random bit b = {0, 1}, generates the pseudonyms Πvi and the shares
Sa(γvi) ∀i ∈ I, a ∈ A˜, v ∈ Vhb ,V lb and communicates them to D.
(3) D outputs a bit b′.
The architecture provides |A|-blindness if:
P (b
′
= b | Πvi, Sa(γvi)∀i ∈ I, a ∈ A˜, v ∈ Vhb ,V lb) = P (b
′
= b) =
1
2
The proof that our proposed infrastructure is blind descends from the property of perfect secrecy of
the SSS scheme [36] and can be constructed by straightforwardly extending the one provided in ([37],
Theorem 3) for two sets of shares to a scenario with |I|(|Vl| + |Vh|) sets of shares. The theorem proves
that, given two secrets m0,m1, two sets of their shares S0,S1 of cardinality t − 1 and a random bit
b ∈ {0, 1}, the probability that an adversary provided with mb,S0,S1 can guess the correct value of b
is 1/2.
Thus, it follows that:
P (b
′
= b | Sa(γvi)∀i ∈ I, a ∈ A˜, v ∈ Vhb ,V lb) = P (b
′
= b) =
1
2
The proof is completed by noting that the pseudonyms Πvi are random numbers refreshed at every
epoch, therefore the knowledge of Πvi does not provide any advantage toD: in particular, from the point
of view of the collusion A˜, if bvi = 1 no Vehicle v appears to be more likely to be the sender of bvi
than any other Vehicle v ∈ Vh
b
. Analogously, if bvi = 0, all the Vehicles in V lb are equally likely to have
generated bvi. It follows that the collusion A˜ obtains no information to reconstruct the succession of bvi
generated by a given Vehicle v during the succession of epochs I.
Definition 2. The scheduling architecture is oblivious if the Anonymizer has no knowledge of the priority
bit bvi, the values γvi and the scheduling outputs ΓΠvi in any epoch i.
To formalize this property, we define the Oblivious experiment, which involves a challenger C
controlling the set of Aggregators and an adversary D controlling the Anonymizer:
(1) D selects two Vehicles v0, v1 ∈ V and communicates to C the priority bits bv0i, bv1i, the values
γv0i, γv1i, and the random numbers ρ1, ρ2, . . . , ρt−1 to be used to divide γv0i, γv1i in shares.
(2) C selects a random bit b = {0, 1}, generates EKae (bvbi||Sa(γvbi)||K
vbi
e ) ∀a ∈ A and the encrypted
scheduling output E
K
v
b
i
e
(oΠv
b
i
), and communicates them to D.
(3) D outputs a bit b′.
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The architecture provides obliviousness if:
P (b
′
= b | EKae (bvbi||Sa(γvbi)||K
vbi
e )∀a ∈ A, E
K
v
b
i
e
(oΠv
b
i
)) = P (b
′
= b) =
1
2
Assuming that the cryptosystem E(Ke, ·) ensures message indistinguishability (see Section 4), the
property can be proved by contradiction: let us suppose that the adversary D has more than negligible
advantage in the Oblivious experiment. Since in Oblivious the adversaryD arbitrarily chooses the
plaintext data and all the parameters of the SSS scheme, Oblivious is constructed analogously to the
IND-CPA experiment [34]. Therefore, ifD has more than negligible advantage over randomness to guess
b in the Oblivious experiment, it also has a non-negligible advantage in the IND-CPA experiment,
which violates the assumption of message indistinguishability under chosen plaintext.
Finally, it is worth discussing the correctness of our privacy-friendly scheduling protocol: at the end
of the scheduling procedure, it results Sa(Pi) =
∑
Πvi∈Si ΓΠvi · Sa(γvi). Therefore, the overall energy
usage reconstructed by means of the secret recovery procedure would be Pi =
∑
Πvi∈Si ΓΠvi · γvi. Since
the value of ΓΠvi is set based on the result of the comparison protocol presented in [30], which has been
therein proved to be correct, it follows that the output of the privacy-friendly scheduling algorithm is the
same that would be obtained by operating directly on the plaintexts.
6. Benchmark ILP Model
We now introduce an Integer Linear Programming formulation which finds the optimal battery
charge/discharge schedule. Such model should be considered as an ideal benchmark, since it relies
on future knowledge about the periods in which EVs are plugged in, the current battery level and the
amount of energy to be refilled, which would impose great limitations to its applicability to a real scenario
(e.g., by requiring the users to declare in advance their traveling periods for the next day).
Sets
• P: set of recharge periods of the EVs (each vehicle v ∈ V has at least one recharge period within
the optimization time span)
• I: set of discretized epochs within the optimization time span
Parameters
• ep: maximum amount of power to be provided during the recharge period p (given by the difference
between the battery maximum capacity and the initial battery charge level lv of the Vehicle v
having the p-th recharge period)
• ap: minimum amount of power to be provided during the recharge period p (av = tv− lv if lv < tv,
0 otherwise)
• rp: battery charge rate (per epoch) of the vehicle v having the p-th recharge period
• kpi: it is 1 if epoch i belongs to the p-th recharge period, 0 otherwise
• gi: maximum grid power supply (if gi > 0) or demand (if gi < 0) at epoch i
• u+i : boolean indicator, it is 1 if gi ≥ 0, 0 otherwise
• u−i : boolean indicator, it is 1 if gi < 0, 0 otherwise
• M : positive value, such as M  maxi∈I |gi|
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Variables
• xpi: integer variable (−1 ≤ xpi ≤ 1), it is 1(−1) if the battery of the vehicle associated to the p-th
recharge period is recharged(discharged) at epoch i, 0 otherwise
• δ: indicates the minimum ratio of the power utilized (provided) for battery recharge (discharge),
to the power supplied/requested by the grid
Objective function
max δ (1)
Constraints ∑
i∈I
kpirpxpi ≤ ep ∀p ∈ P (2)
∑
i∈I
kpirpxpi ≥ ap ∀p ∈ P (3)
∑
p∈P
kpirpxpi ≤ gi +Mu−i ∀i ∈ I (4)
∑
p∈P
kpirpxpi ≥ gi −Mu+i ∀i ∈ I (5)
δ ≤
∑
p∈P kpirpxpi
gi
∀i ∈ I (6)
The objective function maximizes the minimum ratio of the power requested by the aggregator
to recharge the vehicles’ batteries (or obtained by the aggregator by discharging them) to the power
requested/offered by the grid. Constraints 2 and 3 limit the minimum/maximum amount of energy to
be charged during each recharge period, while Constraints 4 and 5 avoid recharging batteries with more
energy than the grid can provide or injecting excessive energy into the grid by discharging batteries
during the periods of shortages. Finally, Constraints 6 set δ to the minimum normalized amount of
scheduled power absorption/supply.
7. Performance Evaluation
We now evaluate our proposed scheduling mechanism in terms of computational complexity, message
number and length, and compare its performance to the optimal results obtained by means of the ILP
formulation presented in Section 6. Our implementation assumes a 256 bit-long modulo q for the SSS
scheme and IDs/pseudonyms of 32 bits. The hybrid cryptosystem used for the share encryption is the
RSA-KEM Key Transport Algorithm [38], which uses the RSA public key cryptosystem with modulo n
of 1024 bits, the KDF2 key derivation function (based on SHA-1) and the AES-Wrap-128 key-wrapping
scheme to communicate an ephemeral 128-bit-long key used to encrypt the samples V (i) by means of
the standard AES scheme operating in Chipher Block Chaining mode (CBC). The scheduling output
destined to the EVs is assumed to be encrypted with the standard RSA public key cryptosystem.
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7.1. Computational Complexity
We start evaluating the asymptotic number of incoming/outgoing messages at each node. As showed
in Table 2, the number of messages exchanged by the Vehicles exhibits a linear dependence on the
number of shares |A|, while for the Anonymizer it depends linearly on both |A| and the number of
EVs |V|. Finally, for the Aggregators the dependence is linear in |V| and superlinear in |A| (due to the
collaborative comparison procedure discussed in [30]).
Table 2. Asymptotic complexity in terms of incoming/outgoing messages per node for the
scheduling of a single service request.
Node Input Output
Vehicle O(1) O(|A|)
Anonymizer O(|A| · |V|) O(|A| · |V|)
Aggregator O(|A|2 log2 |A| · |V|) O(|A|2 log2 |A| · |V|)
Table 3 reports the operations performed by each node for the scheduling of a single battery recharge.
The computational cost of each operation is detailed in Table 4 based on [28,30]. The most demanding
procedure is the share collaborative comparison performed by the Aggregators in multiple rounds
depending on |A|.
Table 3. Computational load at each node for the scheduling of a single service request.
Vehicle 1 random number generation modulo n+ V˜ Cs(q) + |A|CRSA−KEMe (n, 11) + CRSAd (n)
Anonymizer 1 random number generation modulo 232
Aggregator CRSA−KEMd (n, 11) + 2Cc(q) + ca(q) + C
RSA
e (n) (worst case)
see Table 4 for the cost details.
Finally, it is worth discussing the message length: each service request generated by an EV and
forwarded by the Anonymizer consists on a 32 bit-long ID/pseudonym and a RSA-KEM encrypted
message of 2624 bits, for a total length of 2656 bits. During the share comparison procedure, each share is
in turn divided in |A| shares and redistributed among the Aggregators. In a worst case scenario in which
all the EVs have low priority, each Aggregator sends/receives at most |V| · |A| · (|A| − 1) messages of
256 bits each (see [30] for further details) per comparison round (note that the number of rounds exhibits
a logaritmic dependency on |A|). Ultimately, the scheduling output for each EV Γvi is encrypted and
forwarded to the Anonymizer together with the respective pseudonym, thus requiring |V| messages of
32 + 1024 = 1056 bits each. In a scenario with |A| = 4 and |V| = 1000 the throughput per scheduling
epoch experienced by each Aggregator would be approximately (worst case) 8.6 Mbit/epoch, of which
4.9 Mbit/epoch are due to the inter-Aggregators communications and 3.7 Mbit/epoch are due to the
EVs-to-Aggregators communications). It follows that the inter-Aggregators communication burden,
which would be avoided in case of a single scheduling entity directly accessing the raw data
generated by the EVs, is an additional communication cost required by the privacy-preserving
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approach. Such throughput values are compatible with state-of-the art communication technologies for
V2G infrastructures.
Table 4. Detail of operation costs.
Cs(x)
cost of the generation of |A|
shares modulo x
|A|(|A| − 1) additions modulo x
|A|(|A| − 1) multiplications modulo x
(|A| − 1) random number generations modulo x
Ca(x)
cost of a share addition
modulo x
1 addition modulo x
Cl(x)
cost of a share Lagrange
interpolation modulo x
O(|A|2) multiplications modulo x
Cm(x)
cost of a share collaborative
multiplication modulo x
Cs(x) + (|A| − 1)Ca(x)+ 2 multiplications modulo x,
performed in 2 rounds
Cc(x)
cost of a collaborative
comparison modulo x
2 random number generation modulo x + 1 random
number generation modulo 2
2 exponentiations modulo q + 2 multiplications
modulo x
2Cs(x) + (|A| + 1)Ca(x) + O(|A|)Cm(x) + Cl(x),
performed in dlog2 |A|e rounds
CRSAe (x)
cost of an RSA encryption
modulo x
1 exponentiation modulo x
CRSAd (x)
cost of an RSA decryption
modulo x
1 exponentiation modulo x
CRSA−KEMe (x, l)
cost of an RSA-KEM
encryption with RSA modulo x
and AES encryption of a
message of l blocks
1 random number generation modulo x+CRSAe (x)
1 KDF2 key derivation and
AES-Wrap-128 key wrapping
l AES encryptions
CRSA−KEMd (x, l)
cost of an RSA-KEM
decryption with RSA modulo x
and AES decryption of a
message of l blocks
CRSAd (x)
1 KDF2 key derivation and
AES-Wrap-128 key unwrapping
l AES decryptions
7.2. Numerical Results
We compare the scheduling results obtained by our proposed protocol to the ILP benchmark model.
We consider a scenario of a residential area of 1000 houses with peak power consumption of 3 kW [39],
a windfarm (peak production of 8 MW [40]) and 1000 EVs (battery maximum capacity between 12.75
and 17 kWh, charging rate of 0.75 or 1 kW [14], minimum recharge threshold between 1.5 and 2 kWh).
The behavior of each Vehicle v is modeled by means of a discrete random walk between 0 and 1 with state
transition probability of 0.25. For each epoch, state 0 is mapped to kvi = 0, while state 1 sets kvi = rv.
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Note that, since the ILP model does not take into account the energy price, such price is assumed to be
constant within the whole optimization time span and does not play any role in the scheduling strategy
in both the optimal and the privacy-friendly approaches.
Results averaged over 365 days (each day is divided in 96 epochs of 15 min duration, see Figure 3
for an example of daily schedule) show that the running time of the privacy-friendly approach is
significantly lower than the one of the ILP model (seconds vs. hours, see Table 5). The minimum
power consumption-to-power availability ratio provided by our algorithm is on average lower than the
optimal one, which is due to the fact that, in case gi is negative, the privacy-friendly approach always
schedules the recharge of high priority EVs, while the ILP model might postpone it according to the
knowledge of their future traveing behavior. However, the degree of similarity (expressed in terms of
Mean Square Error) between the curve of the grid power supply/request and the curve of the scheduled
energy usage is not significantly worsened w.r.t. the optimal solution provided by the ILP formulation
(only 0.2% increase, as reported in Table 5).
Figure 3. Comparison of optimal vs. privacy-friendly scheduled battery charges/discharges.
Positive values indicate that the grid provides power to recharge the EVs’ batteries, while
negative values indicate that power provided by the batteries is injected into the grid.
Table 5. Comparison of the performance of ILP vs. privacy-friendly scheduling.
Privacy-friendly S. ILP
Average Max Min Aver. MSE Time Average Max Min Aver. MSE Time
−6.64 0.11 −167.98 4.72× 1012 0.6 s 0.03 0.48 −0.38 4.71× 1012 4 h
8. Conclusions
This paper proposes a privacy-preserving Vehicle-to-Grid communication infrastructure which
schedules the battery charge/discharge times of electric vehicles without exposing the users’ traveling
habits, the current battery level nor the amount of refilled energy. Performance in terms of computational
times and gap w.r.t. the optimal schedule obtained by means of an Integer Linear Program shows the
viability of the proposed privacy-friendly approach, which provides results not significantly dissimilar
w.r.t. the optimal ones.
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